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Abstract: Radical skepticism is the view that we know nothing, or at least next to 
nothing.  Nearly no one actually  believes that skepticism is true.  Yet it  has re­
mained a serious topic of discussion for millennia and it looms large in popular 
culture. What explains its persistent and widespread appeal? How does the skep­
tic get us to doubt what we ordinarily take ourselves to know? I present evidence 
from two experiments that classic skeptical arguments gain potency from an in­
teraction  between  two  factors.  First,  people evaluate  inferential  belief  more 
harshly than perceptual belief.  Second,  people evaluate inferential  belief more 
harshly when its  content is  negative (i.e. that something is  not the case) than 
when it’s positive (i.e. that something is the case). It just so happens that potent 
skeptical arguments tend to focus our attention on  negative inferential beliefs, 
and we are especially prone to doubt that such beliefs count as knowledge. That 
is, our cognitive evaluations are biased against this specific combination of source 
and content. The skeptic sows seeds of doubt by exploiting this feature of our psy­
chology.
1. Introduction
We face uncertainty all the time. Doubt and ignorance are unavoidable facts of 
life. But they are neither permanent nor irreparable. As much as doubt and igno­
rance dot the landscape of our existence, so too does knowledge. Inquiry reme­
dies ignorance and diminishes uncertainty: we pass, step by step, from ignorance 
to knowledge, from uncertainty to understanding. In this respect, modern science 
is  a macrocosm of the cognitive path we each take through life. Our cognitive 
* This is the penultimate version of a paper to appear in Cognitive Science. Please cite the fi­
nal, published version if possible.
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powers are fallible and limited, but no less impressive for all that.
Skeptics  notoriously  disagree.  Radical skepticism is the view that we know 
nothing, or at least next to nothing. Some forms of skepticism allow that we know 
facts about how things currently appear to us (e.g. “I seem to be in pain”) or obvi­
ous basic conceptual truths (e.g. “2 > 1”). But, in general, to be skeptical about a 
domain is  to deny that we know that specific  propositions in that domain are 
true.  Many researchers  assume that knowledge  is  a  mental  state  (Premack  & 
Woodruff, 1978;  Pillow, 1989; Povinelli, Nelson & Boysen, 1990;  Perner,  Frith, 
Leslie  &  Leekam, 1989;  Povinelli & deBlois,  1992;  Flavell,  2000;  Williamson, 
2000; Hare, Call & Tomasello, 2001; Sprung, 2010).  Accordingly, we can frame 
skepticism in terms of mental state ascription: to be skeptical about a domain is 
to deny all knowledge ascriptions regarding that domain. People might have be­
liefs or convictions or hopes or intentions about the domain, but they don’t have 
knowledge.
Skepticism lives a life beyond Philosophy 101. Skepticism readily captures the 
public imagination and is a staple of popular culture. Gaming boards feed on it. 
For instance, the motto of the New York State Lottery is, “Hey, you never know” 
(http://nylottery.ny.gov/wps/portal).  Hollywood grows rich on it.  Witness  the 
many successful  films  that  put  skeptical  doubts  front  and  center.  Foremost 
among  these  are  The  Matrix (do  you  know that  you’re  not  in  The  Matrix?), 
Vanilla Sky (do you know that you’re life is  not just a dream?), The Truman 
Show (do you know that your life isn’t just one big charade?),  Bladerunner (do 
you know that this individual isn’t a replicant?), Dark City and Memento (do you 
know that you’re past is what it seems to be?). If nothing else, skillful trafficking 
in skeptical doubt is a lucrative business. Not only does skepticism live a life be­
yond Philosophy 101, but apparently the skilled skeptic can live lavishly.
Nevertheless, just as no battle plan survives contact with the enemy, radical 
skepticism doesn’t  survive  contact  with daily  life.  The skeptic  tells  us that we 
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don’t know that we’re not merely dreaming, or that other people have minds, or 
that the universe is older than five minutes, or that our past is what it seems to  
be, or that there is an objective world outside our minds, or that snow is white, or 
that  the  next  time  we  eat  bread  it  will  nourish  us,  etc.  (Sextus  Empiricus; 
Descartes, 1641; Bayle, 1702; Berkeley, 1710; Hume, 1748; Russell, 1921; Unger, 
1975). We find these assertions incredible and are prone to reject them out of 
hand as ridiculous and inconsistent with common sense (Reid, 1764). Sane peo­
ple do not and cannot seriously doubt such things in practice. But even granting 
that this is the wise response, residual dissatisfaction remains. Unless we’re able 
to identify a flaw in the skeptic’s performance — some error or trick that takes us 
in  — thoughtful people will  continue to find the situation somewhat troubling 
(Stroud, 1984; DeRose, 1995). True, we carry on with our lives in much the same 
way (Hume, 1739: Bk 1.4.7); but it is with a slightly heavier heart. No matter if we 
can’t figure out  how the peddler swindles people with his shell game, the wise 
person just walks right by and keeps her money in her pocket. But the  curious 
wise person still feels the mild sting of ignorance and suffers more than a mod­
icum of intellectual anxiety.
All this raises an interesting psychological question. If nearly no one accepts 
skepticism, then  why do skeptical arguments perennially fascinate us? Why do 
we, individually and collectively, over thousands of years, keep revisiting skepti­
cism?
This paper begins the task of explaining what in our psychology renders us 
vulnerable to these skeptical doubts. This entails a subtle shift in focus from the 
recent  flurry of valuable  experimental  work on commonsense cognitive evalua­
tions  (Swain,  Alexander & Weinberg,  2008;  Wright,  2010;  May  et  al.,  2010; 
Beebe  & Buckwalter, 2010;  Feltz  & Zarpentine,  2010;  Starmans  & Friedman, 
2012; Schaffer  & Knobe,  2012; Beebe & Jensen, 2012;  Sripada & Stanley, 2012; 
Turri, 2013;  Nagel,  San Juan & Mar, 2013;  Myers-Shulz & Schwitzgebel, 2013; 
Skeptical appeal: the source-content bias  |  4
Murray, Sytsma & Livengood, in press; Buckwalter & Schaffer, in press; Buckwal­
ter,  Rose  & Turri,  in  press),  otherwise  known  as  “folk  epistemology”  (Mont­
gomery 1992; Bartsch 2002; Hardy-vallée & Dubreuil 2010; Mercier 2010; Spicer 
2010; Turri & Friedman 2014). While knowledge attribution has been the focus of 
considerable attention recently,  its conceptual flip-side  has not: knowledge  de-
nial.  Knowledge denial  is the skeptic’s stock  in trade.  So our guiding question 
might be put this way: how does the skeptic get us interested in purchasing his 
wares?
1.1. The classical argument for skepticism and two examples
We will focus on the most celebrated and influential skeptical strategy (Descartes, 
1641;  Moore,  1959;  Dretske,  1970;  Unger,  1975;  Stine,  1976; Goldman,  1976; 
Lewis, 1979; Nozick, 1981;Stroud, 1984; Cohen, 1988; DeRose, 1995; Sosa, 1999; 
Pritchard, 2002; Cohen, 2005; for an overview see Turri 2014, esp. §§1-4, 19-23, 
47-49). The strategy is to proceed in three stages. First identify some claim that 
we would ordinarily take ourselves to know (call it ‘O’ for ‘ordinary claim’). Next 
identify some tricky claim (call it ‘T’ for ‘tricky claim’), the denial of which (~T) 
obviously follows from O. It’s important that we have the intuition that we ordi­
narily could not know ~T. Then reason as follows.
1. If we know that O, then we know that ~T.
2. But we don’t know that ~T.
3. So we don’t know that O.
This is sometimes called “the classical argument for skepticism” and charac­
terized as “exceedingly compelling” (Unger, 1975: 8–9). The argument is logically 
valid and appeals to premises that we find plausible. Yet its conclusion is incredi­
ble and contradicts something we normally take for granted. Some consider this 
to be a genuine paradox (Cohen, 1988).  For decades resolving this paradox has 
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been a central concern in the theory of knowledge.
This  classic  argumentative  strategy can be  used to  challenge many,  if  not 
most, of  the  things  we  ordinarily  take  ourselves  to  know  (Vogel,  1990; 
Hawthorne, 2004). We’ll briefly consider two examples familiar from the litera­
ture on skepticism, which will then inform the experimental studies reported be­
low.
First, we ordinarily take ourselves to know where  various objects important 
to us are. For instance, when Maxwell is done at work for the day, he knows that 
his car is parked in the parking garage (O). However, it’s not uncommon for cars 
to be stolen. Does Maxwell know that his car has not been stolen (~T)? It can eas­
ily seem that Maxwell does not know this (Vogel, 1990). But, of course, Maxwell 
does know that if his car is parked in the garage, then it hasn’t been stolen (if O, 
then ~T). So, the skeptic invites us to conclude, Maxwell doesn’t know where his 
car is after all.
Second, we ordinarily take ourselves to know what natural kinds things be­
long to. For instance, if Zoe goes to the zoo and sees a large, menacing, spotted fe­
line in the exhibit labelled “Jaguar,” she knows that the animal is a jaguar (O).  
However, it’s not unheard of for zoos to make mistakes or temporary substitu­
tions in a pinch to please their patrons. Does Zoe know that the animal is not a 
leopard that looks just like a jaguar in a jaguar display (~T)? It can seem that Zoe 
does not know this (Dretske, 1970: 1016; Unger, 1975: 8). But, of course, Zoe 
knows that  if the animal is a jaguar, then it’s not a leopard  of any sort. More 
pointedly, she knows that if it’s a jaguar, then it’s not a leopard that looks just like 
a jaguar in a jaguar display (if O, then ~T). But Zoe does not know that the ani­
mal is not a leopard that looks just like a jaguar in a jaguar display. So, the skeptic 
invites us to conclude, Zoe doesn’t know that it’s a jaguar after all.
We could multiply examples, but the two we’ve covered are enough to illus­
trate how the skeptic’s strategy works. The experiments reported below use vi­
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gnettes based on these two examples familiar from the literature on skepticism.
1.2. A theory in two parts
Here is one theory about why the classical skeptical argument can seem so po­
tent.  The theory has two  parts. On the one hand,  people  view perception as a 
more likely source of knowledge than inference. That is, other things being equal, 
people more readily classify a belief as knowledge when it’s based on observation 
than when it’s  based on inference  from background knowledge.  On the other 
hand, people view positive inferential belief as a more likely candidate for knowl­
edge than negative inferential belief.  That is, other things being equal,  an infer­
ential belief that something is the case is more likely to be classified as knowledge 
than an inferential belief that something is not the case.
If true, these two points can explain the classical skeptical argument’s force. 
First,  the  argument gets  us  to  focus  on what  seems like  an inferential  belief. 
We’re left to think that observation is of no further help, so the agent in question 
is left  to  infer the relevant  proposition from prior experience and background 
knowledge. Second,  the argument gets us to focus on whether something is  not 
the case, so the inferential belief in question has negative content. On this theory, 
it’s possible that the appeal of skepticism has nothing special to do with either the 
form of argument that the skeptic employs or the cleverness of the skeptic’s tricky 
alternative scenarios. Rather, it could just be that skepticism’s appeal is due to 
the fact that we’re heavily biased against classifying negative inferential beliefs as 
knowledge.
Both experiments below were designed to  help evaluate these possibilities. 
Experiment 1 examines the effect of two factors on knowledge denial in contexts 
where skeptical possibilities are explicitly raised and considered. The two factors 
are a belief’s source, perceptual versus inferential, and a belief’s content, positive 
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versus negative.  If  my hypothesis  is  correct,  then we  should see high rates of 
knowledge denial precisely in cases of negative inferential belief.  This is in fact 
what we observe. Experiment 2 focuses in on inferential belief specifically and 
again examines the effect of negative versus positive content on people’s willing­
ness to deny knowledge. Again we see that negative inferential belief is evaluated 
more harshly than positive inferential belief, even when each is based on a long 
and unbroken track record of evidence.
Experiment 2 also accomplishes something further. The skeptic focuses only 
on the ordinary claim (O) and the denial of the tricky alternative scenario (~T); 
he draws skeptical conclusions based this comparison  and invites us to do the 
same. It might seem that the difficulty here stems from something about denying 
this  particular  alternative. But  the difficulty might instead  stem from  denying 
this  particular alternative.  To test between these possibilities, Experiment 2 ex­
amines rates of knowledge attribution for O and ~T alongside those for the denial 
of O (i.e. ~O). The results suggest that skeptic induces doubt not because his al­
ternative is especially difficult to rule out, but rather because the focus shifts from 
affirmative to negative content.
My hypothesis about the source of skepticism’s allure  can be motivated in 
light of two substantial bodies of  psychological research. On the one hand,  re­
searchers have found that people exhibit an “anti-inference bias”  and are more 
comfortable relying on direct perceptual evidence, even when the perceptual evi­
dence is acknowledged to be less reliable than the inference (Zamir, Rito & Teich­
man,  in press).  Young children  are apt to attribute knowledge to subjects with 
perceptual access to a fact, (Pillow, 1989), but they are often reluctant to attribute 
knowledge based on simple valid inferences (Sodian & Wimmer 1987). Evidence 
from comparative psychology suggests that nonhuman animals, including chim­
panzees  (Povinelli & Eddy, 1996;  Call & Tomasello, 2008),  bottlenose  dolphins 
(Reiss, 2001),  domestic dogs (Horowitz, 2008),  and  several bird species (Dally, 
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Emery & Clayton, 2005; Keefner, 2013) attribute mental states to conspecifics, 
and that these attributions are influenced by what the conspecific has perceptual 
access to. On the other hand, decades of behavioral research show that it requires 
more effort to represent and perform computations over negations than affirma­
tions (see Conclusion for references). Moreover, increased effort can be expected 
to diminish confidence in the truth of a claim (Reber & Schwarz, 1999;  Oppen­
heimer, 2008), and since knowledge requires truth, this could in turn be expected 
to increase rates of knowledge denial.
In addition to the fact that my hypothesis can be grounded in prior psycho­
logical findings, it is novel in two respects. First, it marshals those findings in or­
der to diagnose the psychological source of a specific, perennial philosophical co­
nundrum.1 Second, it posits an interaction effect of a belief’s source and content 
on judgments about knowledge. While prior research has noted the effects of be­
lief source and negative content, respectively, the interaction of these two factors 
has not been  documented.  Prior influential work in cognitive science has made 
progress  in  identifying  psychological  mechanisms  and  processes  by  studying 
moral cognition through the lens of longstanding philosophical disputes in ethics, 
especially  those  motivated  by  poignant  thought  experiments  involving  moral 
dilemmas (e.g. Greene et al. 2001; Cushman & Greene 2012). If my hypothesis is 
correct, then the same could be true of studying cognitive evaluations through the 
lens of classical skeptical challenges.
1 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting language along these lines.




Participants (N = 607, 204 female, aged 18–69, mean age = 29.68 years) were re­
cruited  and  tested  using  an  online  platform  (Amazon  Mechanical  Turk  + 
Qualtrics) and compensated $0.30 for approximately 2 minutes of their  time. 
Participation was restricted to those residing in the United States and 97 percent 
reported English as  a native language. Participants were not  allowed to re-take 
the survey; repeat participation was prevented by screening AMT Worker IDs. 
They filled out a brief demographic survey after testing. I excluded data from 32 
participants who failed comprehension questions. Including data from these par­
ticipants didn’t affect the pattern of results reported below. 
2.1.2. Materials and procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions in a 2 (Story: Car, 
Specimen) × 2 (Content: Negative, Positive) × 2 (Source: Inference, Perception) 
between-subjects  design.  Participants in each condition read a different  story. 
Two different storylines were used to ensure that the results weren’t due to super­
ficial features of a particular case. The stories were based on widely discussed ex­
amples in the literature on skepticism  (see section  1.1).  For each  storyline, the 
source and content of the protagonist’s belief was varied similarly.
The basic storyline for Car featured an office worker, Maxwell, who  parked 
his  car  in  the  parking garage when he arrived at  work  a  while  ago.  Now it’s 
lunchtime and Maxwell and his assistant are looking for a document. Maxwell 
suspects that he left the document in his car. Maxwell’s assistant asks him where 
his car is parked and, in the process, points out, “It’s not unheard of for cars to be 
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stolen.” The Content factor varies which aspect of the assistant’s speech Maxwell 
focuses on: where the car is parked versus whether the car has been stolen. Par­
ticipants in the Negative conditions were asked whether Maxwell knows that his 
car was  not stolen. Participants in the Positive conditions were asked whether 
Maxwell knows that his car is parked in the spot he parked in this morning. The 
Source factor varies what source Maxwell bases his answer on. In the Inference 
conditions, Maxwell thinks for a moment before answering, unaided by observa­
tion. In the Perception condition, Maxwell looks out the window before answer­
ing. Here is the story (manipulations bracketed and separated by a slash):
When Mr. Maxwell arrives at work in the morning, he always parks in one 
of two spots: C8 or D8. Half the time he parks in C8, and half the time he 
parks in D8. Today Maxwell parked in C8. It's lunchtime at work. Maxwell  
and his assistant are up in the archives room searching for a particular 
document. Maxwell says, "I might have left the document in my car." The 
assistant asks, "Mr. Maxwell, is your car parked in space C8? It's not un­
heard of for cars to be stolen." Maxwell [thinks for a moment / looks out 
the window] and then responds, "[No, my car hasn’t been stolen / Yes, my 
car is in C8]."
After reading the story, participants answered two comprehension questions 
and a test question about what Maxwell knows (options in parentheses)
1. Maxwell parked in _____. (C8/D8)
2. Maxwell is in the _____. (archives room/parking garage/cafeteria)
3. Maxwell  _____  that  his  car  [is  parked  in  C8  /  has  not  been  stolen]. 
(knows/only believes)
The  basic  storyline  for  Specimen  featured  an  avid  zoo  patron,  Michelle, 
whose favorite exhibit is “The Big Cat Exhibit.” Over thousands of observations, 
the  animal  in  the  exhibit  has  always  been  a  jaguar.  The Source  factor  varies 
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whether Michelle judges the animal based on perception (Perception) or based on 
an  inference  unaided  by observation (Inference).  The  Content  factor  varies 
whether Michelle thinks that the animal is a jaguar (Positive), or that the animal 
is  not a  leopard (Negative).  Participants  in  the  Positive condition were asked 
whether Michelle knows that the animal is a jaguar; in the Negative condition 
they were asked whether Michelle knows that it’s not a leopard. Here is the story:
Michelle has visited the city zoo every day for the past ten years. Her fa­
vorite exhibit is The Big Cat Exhibit. Over thousands of observations, the 
animal in this exhibit has always been a jaguar. Today [Michelle must stay 
home and can't visit the zoo because she sprained her ankle. While relax­
ing on the couch /  when Michelle left home to visit the zoo, she almost 
sprained her ankle. While looking at the animal in the exhibit], Michelle 
thinks, "The animal in the Big Cat Exhibit today is [a jaguar / not a leop­
ard]." And she is right: it is [a jaguar / not a leopard].
After reading the story,  participants were asked two comprehension ques­
tions and a test question:
1. The animal _____ a jaguar. (is/is not)
2. Michelle is _____. (at home/at the zoo)
3. Michelle _____ that the animal is [a jaguar / not a leopard]. (knows/only 
believes)
Participants who failed a comprehension question  were excluded from the 
analysis. Questions were always asked in the same order and response options 
were  always  rotated  randomly.  The  story  remained  at  the  top  of  the  page 
throughout the survey.
2.2. Results
An initial omnibus regression was used to determine whether knowledge denial 
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was predicted by storyline or participant gender.  In line with previous research 
on knowledge ascriptions  (Wright, 2008; Turri,  2013; Nagel et al.,  2013; Fried­
man and Turri, under review),  participant gender didn’t predict knowledge de­
nial. There was no main effect of participant gender (Wald = 0.012, df = 1, p = .
911, n.s., all tests two-tailed unless otherwise noted) and no interaction with Con­
tent  (Wald = 2.11, df = 1,  p = .146),  Source (Wald = 0.03, df = 1,  p = .863), or 
Story (Wald = 0.534, df = 1, p = .465). Similarly, logistic regression showed that 
there was no main effect of Story (Wald = 1.161, df = 1, p = .281, n.s.) and no in­
teraction with Content (Wald = 1.03, df = 1,  p = .310, n.s.)  or Source  (Wald = 
0.021, df = 1, p = .885). Because gender and story had no effect, the analyses that 
follow collapse across these factors.
Binary logistic regression was performed to assess the impact of Source and 
Content on the likelihood that participants would deny knowledge (Table 1). The 
model contained Source, Content,  and the interaction of Source and Content as 
predictor variables  and knowledge denial as the outcome variable. (Preliminary 
analysis was conducted to ensure no violation of multicollinearity assumptions.) 
In light of the hypothesis proposed in section 1.2, I expected two things.  First, 
there would be  a main effect of Source, with inferential belief predicting higher 
rates of knowledge denial.  Second, there would be a significant interaction  be­
tween Source and Content, with negative content more strongly predicting higher 
rates of knowledge denial for inferential belief.
Both predictions were true (Table 1). The full model was statistically signifi­
cant,  χ2(3, N = 607) = 93.82, p < .001. It explained between 14.3% (Cox and Snell 
R Square) and 19.4% (Nagelkerke R Square) of the variance in knowledge denial, 
and  it  correctly classified 70% of cases.  Source of belief  made  a unique  statisti­
cally significant contribution to the model. By changing the source of the protago­
nist’s  belief  from perception to  inference,  the  odds of  denying knowledge  in­
creased by 280% (or a factor of 2.8). Content of belief did not make a unique sta­
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tistically significant contribution to the model. Crucially, there was a significant 
interaction between the source and content of belief: by changing the content of 
the protagonist’s belief from positive to negative, the odds of denying knowledge 
increased more for  inferential  belief  than for perceptual  belief  (by  a factor of 
2.33).
Table 1.  Experiment  1. Logistic  regression  predicting  knowledge  denial.  (Reference  class  for 
Source: Perception. Reference class for Content: Positive.)
B S.E. Wald df p Odds 
Ratio
95% C.I. for Odds 
Ratio
Lower Upper
Source 1.03 .26 16.13 1 <.001 2.8 1.70 4.64
Content .349 .27 1.69 1 =.194 1.42 .84 2.40
Source*Content .847 .36 5.43 1 =.02 2.33 1.14 4.76
Constant -1.33 .20 44.77 1 <.001 .264
As a further way of clarifying and illustrating the results, I report some pair­
wise comparisons among the cells. If the hypothesis proposed in section 1.2 is 
correct, then we would expect three things. We would expect knowledge denial to 
be (1) significantly  higher  in  Negative Inference than in  Positive Inference,  (2) 
significantly higher in Positive inference than in Positive Perception and Negative 
Perception, but (3) no different between between Positive Perception and Nega­
tive Perception.
All three expectations are met (Figure 1). First, rate of knowledge denial was 
higher in Negative Inference (N = 145, 71%) than in Positive Inference (N = 155, 
42.6%),  Fisher’s exact test,  p < .001, Cramer’s V = .287.  Second, knowledge de­
nial  in  Positive  Inference  was  higher  than  in  Positive  Perception  (N =  153, 
20.9%), Fisher’s exact test, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .233, as well as Negative Per­
ception (N = 155, 27.3%), Fisher’s exact test, p = .006, Cramer’s V = .161. Third, 
rate of knowledge denial didn’t  differ between Positive Perception and Negative 
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Perception, Fisher’s exact test,  p = .230, n.s.
Finally, binomial  tests revealed that  only in Negative  Inference did partici­
pants deny knowledge at rates exceeding chance (p < .001). By contrast,  knowl­
edge denial was trending  below chance in Positive Inference (p < .077)  and fell 
far below chance in both Positive Perception and Negative Perception (ps < .001).
Fig. 1. Experiment 1. Denial of knowledge across conditions.
2.3. Discussion
Three main findings emerge from this study. First, participants were more likely 
to deny knowledge in cases of inference than in cases of perception. An inferen­
tial belief is much less likely than a perceptual belief is to be classified as knowl­
edge. Second, a negative inferential belief is much less likely than a positive infer­
ential belief is to be classified as knowledge. The cumulative result is that nega­
tive inferential belief suffers a double-deficit. The interaction effect in the regres­
sion model is particularly good evidence for this double-deficit. (For replications 
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of this interaction effect, see Turri under review.) Third, only when evaluating a 
negative  inferential  belief  did  participants  deny  knowledge  at  rates  exceeding 
chance. In each of the other three conditions — when evaluating positive percep­
tual belief,  negative perceptual belief,  and positive inferential belief  — partici­
pants ascribed knowledge at rates exceeding chance.
Importantly, we observed these patterns while using stories directly based on 
influential cases from the contemporary literature on skepticism. Thus the results 
suggest that skeptics instill doubt in us to the extent that they get us to focus on 
inferential  belief with negative content.  Skeptical  arguments themselves could 
function simply to shift our focus in that way, rather than persuading us in virtue 
of their logic.
These  results  suggest that the  skeptic’s  alternative  scenarios — “your  car 
might have been stolen,” “the animal might be a leopard that looks just like a 
jaguar”  — aren’t especially challenging to rule out.  That is, it’s possible that the 
skeptic has simply alighted on a class of beliefs that we’re antecedently inclined to 
evaluate especially harshly. A second study was designed to investigate this possi­
bility further  by examining whether ruling out the skeptic’s alternatives is any 
more difficult than ruling out more routine claims.
3. Experiment 2
The skeptic singles out the logical implications of propositions we ordinarily take 
ourselves to know. If we ordinarily take ourselves to know O, and we know that O 
entails ~T, then we should also at least be in a position to know ~T. For example, 
if the animal is a jaguar, then it’s not a leopard of any sort. So if you know that the 
animal is a jaguar, then you should also be in a position to know that it’s not a  
leopard. By contrast, the skeptic doesn’t consider whether knowing O is any eas­
ier than knowing its negation (~O).  If the skeptic  really has identified a special 
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problem, then it should be harder to know ~T than it is to know ~O (other things 
being equal). In other words, it’s possible that the key difference might not be be­
tween O and T but rather between negative and affirmative contents.
The Specimen cover story  is particularly well suited  to investigate this. We 
ordinarily take ourselves to know that the animal in the display is a jaguar. And, 
obviously, if it’s a jaguar, then it’s not a leopard.  But  jaguars and leopards look 
very similar. Do we know that it’s not a leopard?  As  we saw in Experiment 1, 
when the agent is able to observe the animal, people tend to say that she knows 
that it’s not a leopard. By contrast, when she doesn’t observe the animal but in­
stead draws an inference, people deny that she knows that it’s not a leopard. Peo­
ple denied knowledge even though her inference was based on a long and unbro­
ken track record: over many years and thousands of observations, the animal in 
the display has always been a jaguar.
But suppose that instead of always being a jaguar, the animal in the display 
had never been a jaguar. Based on this long and unbroken track record, will peo­
ple be any less harsh in evaluating an inferential belief that the animal is  not a 
jaguar?
If the skeptic has identified a special problem, then it should be  viewed as 
harder to know
(~T) that the animal is not a leopard (based on a long and unbroken track 
record of its being a jaguar)
than it is to know
(~O) that the animal is not a jaguar (based on a long and unbroken track 
record of its not being a jaguar).
By contrast, if my earlier  hypothesis is correct, then people will view those two 
propositions as equally difficult to know. In other words, rates of knowledge de­
nial for those two claims will be equally  high  because they are both  inferential 
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and negative. Moreover, rates of knowledge denial for those two claims should be 
significantly higher than for this claim, which is inferential but positive:
(O) that the animal is a jaguar (based on a long and unbroken track record 
of its being a jaguar).
The present study directly tests these suggestions.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Three hundred and five new participants (87 female, aged 18-78,  mean age = 
28.16 years) were tested. They were recruited and compensated the same way as 
in Experiment 1. Ninety-eight percent reported English as a native language. I ex­
cluded data from 11 participants who failed comprehension questions. Including 
data from these participants didn’t affect the pattern of results reported below.
3.1.2. Materials and procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: Positive Jaguar, 
Negative Leopard, and Negative Jaguar. Participants in each condition read a dif­
ferent story. The stories for the Positive Jaguar and Negative Leopard conditions 
in this experiment are very similar to the Specimen stories for the Positive Infer­
ence and Negative Inference conditions in Experiment 1. In the story for Positive 
Jaguar, the animal has always been a jaguar and Michelle thinks that it’s a jaguar 
today too. In the story for Negative Leopard, the animal has always been a jaguar 
and Michelle thinks that it’s not a leopard today either. The story for the Negative 
Jaguar condition  is  similar except that  this time the animal in the display has 
never been a jaguar and Michelle thinks that it’s not a jaguar today either:
Michelle has visited the city zoo every day for the past ten years. Her fa­
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vorite exhibit is The Big Cat Exhibit. Over thousands of observations, the 
animal in this exhibit has  never been a jaguar. Today Michelle must stay 
home and can't visit the zoo because she sprained her ankle. While relax­
ing on the couch, Michelle thinks, "The animal in the Big Cat Exhibit today 
is not a jaguar." And she is right: it is not a jaguar.
There was one difference in procedure between this experiment and Experi­
ment 1: this time participants were also asked to rate their confidence in their an­
swer to the knowledge question. Responses were collected on a 1 (“not at all con­
fident”) to  10  (“completely confident”) scale. This was done to check  for subtle 
differences of opinion not captured by the dichotomous measure. Otherwise, the 
questions and procedure for this experiment are the same as for Experiment 1.
3.2. Results
I  made three predictions  about the rate of knowledge denial:  (1) it  would vary 
across the conditions, (2) it would be lower in Positive Jaguar than in each of the 
other two conditions, (3) it would not differ between Negative Jaguar and Nega­
tive Leopard.
All  three  predictions were true.  First,  the rate of  knowledge denial  varied 
across the conditions, χ2(2, N = 305) = 8.31, p = .016, Cramer’s V = .165. Second, 
pairwise comparisons  revealed that the rate of knowledge denial  was lower in 
Positive  Jaguar  (N =  100,  53%)  than  in Negative  Jaguar  (N  =  103,  71.8%), 
Fisher’s exact test, p = .006, Cramer’s V = .195, and lower in Positive Jaguar than 
in  Negative Leopard (N = 102, 66.7%), Fisher’s exact test,  p = .033, one-tailed, 
Cramer’s V = .139. Third, rate of knowledge denial didn’t differ between Negative 
Jaguar and Negative Leopard, Fisher’s exact test, p = .452, n.s. Figure 2 visualizes 
these results.
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Fig. 2. Experiment 2. Denial of knowledge across conditions.
Binomial tests revealed that rate of knowledge denial was significantly above 
chance in both Negative Jaguar and Negative Leopard (ps < .001). By contrast, it 
was no different from chance in Positive Jaguar (p = .617).
Participants were also asked to rate their confidence in their answer to the 
knowledge question.  A one-way analysis  of  variance  detected no difference in 
confidence scores across the conditions:  Positive Jaguar,  M = 8.67,  SD = 1.68; 
Negative Jaguar,  M = 8.77,  SD = 1.34; Negative Leopard,  M = 8.51,  SD = 1.60; 
F(2) = .715, p = .49, n.s.
3.3. Discussion
Two main things emerge from this study. First, the results replicate a main find­
ing from Experiment 1: negative inferential belief is evaluated more harshly than 
positive inferential belief, even when each is based on a long and unbroken track 
record of evidence. Second, the results support the hypothesis that the skeptic ex­
ploits an evaluative bias against negative inferential beliefs.  The skeptic’s  tricky 
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alternative  scenarios  aren’t  necessarily  especially  difficult  to  rule  out.  For  in­
stance, in this study participants were just as unwilling to ascribe knowledge to 
Michelle that the animal was not a jaguar (~O) as they were to ascribe knowledge 
that the animal was not a leopard (~T). By contrast, participants were much more 
willing to ascribe knowledge that the animal was a jaguar (O).  In short, the key 
difference is not be between O and T but rather between negative and affirmative 
contents.
Once again it seems that the skeptic succeeds in getting us to seriously doubt 
ourselves only in cases of negative inferential belief.
4. Conclusion
Certain skeptical  arguments have  an uncanny ability to simultaneously attract 
and repel our intellects.  They use premises that we find plausible, only to end 
with conclusions that we find absurd. What explains our ambivalent relationship 
to these arguments? Given that nearly no one actually accepts the skeptical con­
clusions, why do we pay any attention to them? Why is skepticism, despite its im­
plausibility, a staple of both intellectual and popular culture?
Philosophers  have  proposed  many  explanations.  Perhaps  it’s because  we 
want to know things and understand what knowledge requires, but we implicitly 
recognize that we can’t meet those requirements (Unger, 1975). Or perhaps there 
are deep tensions in our concept of knowledge, or in our pursuit of it, which lead 
us to vacillate on whether we can ever know anything (Stroud, 1984; Nagel, 1986: 
ch. 5). Or perhaps we misunderstand the relationship between the things we ordi­
narily know and the things the skeptic says we can’t know: maybe we don’t need 
to rule out skeptical alternatives in order to know ordinary things about the world 
around us (Dretske, 1970; Nozick, 1981). Or perhaps the verb ‘knows’ is semanti­
cally  context-sensitive  and the skeptic is able to manipulate the conversational 
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context so that he speaks truthfully when he says we “don’t know”  something 
(Cohen, 1988; DeRose, 1995; Lewis, 1996). Or perhaps the skeptic exploits facts 
about the pragmatics of knowledge discourse or the social function of knowledge 
attributions (Turri, 2010; Turri, 2012; Turri, in press).
But before drawing sweeping conclusions about the nature of knowledge or 
proposing revisionary semantic hypotheses, we might do well to identify psycho­
logical  factors that contribute to  skepticism’s enduring appeal.  I’ve developed a 
version of this last suggestion in this paper.
Our findings from two studies support several conclusions. First, the classic 
skeptical argument poses a greater threat to inferential belief than perceptual be­
lief.  Second,  inferential  belief  with  a  negative  conclusion  is judged  especially 
harshly and is unlikely to be classified as knowledge. Third, it turns out that clas­
sic skeptical arguments owe a good deal of their potency to  this  evaluative  bias 
against negative inferential beliefs,  namely,  the source-content bias.  Before the 
skeptic even shows up, people confidently claim that such beliefs don’t count as 
knowledge. When the skeptic finally does show up to make his case, it  probably 
does not, as some philosophers claim, “come as a surprise” — it is not “startling” 
or “shocking” to hear — that such beliefs don’t seem to be knowledge. The skeptic 
has not “pointed out that we do not know things we would have confidently said 
we knew” (Nozick 1981: 202).  People routinely deny that such beliefs count as 
knowledge. It is not, in the first place, some deep fact about the nature of knowl­
edge or the skeptic’s ingenuity that invites skepticism. It’s our psychology.
The bias against negative content for inferential belief specifically is surpris­
ing and further work is required to better understand it. Voluminous behavioral 
research  shows that  it  is more complicated and effortful to represent negation 
than affirmation  (Wason, 1961;  Wason, 1965; Gough, 1966; Slobin, 1966;  Mac­
Donald & Just,  1989;  Evans, Newstead & Byrne,  1993;  Kaup, 2001;  Hasson & 
Glucksberg, 2006;  Stupple & Waterhouse, 2009),  and recent work in  cognitive 
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neuroscience has  begun  uncovering  the  neural  signatures of  this  difference 
(Christensen, 2009; Kumar,  Padakannaya,  Mishra & Khetrapal, 2013). Accord­
ingly, one might expect knowledge ascriptions for positive claims to be higher in 
general,  whether  the  source  of  belief  is  inference or perception,  because “any 
variable that increases experienced ease of processing is also likely to increase 
judgments of truth” (Reber & Schwarz, 1999: 342). But this is not what we ob­
served. Instead,  we observed significantly lower rates of knowledge  attribution 
for negative inferential beliefs but no corresponding asymmetry for perceptual 
beliefs.
Recent research suggests that a readily accessible schema for accommodating 
negative information promotes greater fluency (Mayo, Schul & Burnstein, 2004). 
For example, “it is not warm” can be more readily processed than “it is not wary” 
because the familiar “cold” accommodates “not warm,” whereas no common ad­
jective as readily  accommodates “not wary.”  However,  in  the studies reported 
here,  the  protagonist’s  negative  belief  had  the  same  content  whether  it  was 
formed perceptually or inferentially,  so a more accessible opposing  conceptual 
schema can’t explain the asymmetry. Thus it’s possible that the source of infor-
mation also facilitates comprehension  of negative information.  Perhaps  people 
more fluently process negative information if the informational source is percep­
tual, thereby raising rates of knowledge ascription. In other words, in addition to 
features of informational  content enhancing fluency, perhaps  features of infor­
mational source can too.
This last suggestion gains some plausibility from a growing body of work on 
the perceptual simulation theory of  linguistic comprehension.  According to this 
view,  when comprehending a text, people construct a mental simulation of the 
situation it describes (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Graesser, Millis & Zwaan, 1997) and 
this mental simulation shares the representational format of perception and ac­
tion (Zwaan, 2004; Bianchi,  Savardi, Burro & Torquati, 2011; see also Barsalou, 
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1999).  Interestingly,  one line of evidence for this view comes from a series of 
studies on negation (Kaup, 2001; Kaup & Zwaan, 2003; Kaup, Yaxley, Madden, 
Zwaan & Lüdtke, 2007; Zwaan & Percher, 2012 replicates relevant results using 
Amazon Mechanical Turk). If people comprehend negations by perceptually sim­
ulating them, then this might help explain why negation affects the evaluation of 
inferential belief differently  than perceptual belief.  For when the protagonist in 
the story forms her belief perceptually, her mode of cognition closely matches the 
mode in which participants simulate and thereby comprehend the case. By con­
trast, when the protagonist forms her belief non-perceptually, her mode of cogni­
tion mismatches the mode in which participants simulate the case.  Participants 
asked to evaluate a negative inferential belief are thus required to dissociate two 
modes of cognition, their own and the protagonist’s, resulting in a more compli­
cated  theory-of-mind task.  This  in turn  could inhibit fluency and  thus  depress 
rates of knowledge attribution.
Regardless of whether this suggestion explains the results observed above, 
the experiments reported here provide evidence for two main conclusions. First, 
there is a source-content bias in cognitive evaluation and, second, classic forms of 
skepticism prey on this bias.
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